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FEES SIMPLE DEFEASIBLE.'
THE PURPOSES THEY SERVE WITH AN APPRAISAL
OF THEIR IJTILITY.2
By M. E. BRAxE*
A conveyor of a fee simple estate in either real or personal
property may desire, through the medium of such conveyance,
to accomplish some purpose in addition to the mere transfer
of the ownership of the conveyed property. Especially is this
true where the conveyance lacks the usual consideration. He
may wish to secure some benefit personal to himself, or another,
through the performance of some service by the conveyee, or
his successors in interest; or to coerce the conveyee in the mat-
ter of such conveyee's conduct; or to direct the course of owner-
ship of the conveyed property by imposing restraints upon its
later alienation; or to continue some direction over the manner
in which the conveyed property may, or shall, be used; etc.
Within very broad limits, the law indulges him in his desires,
and furnishes him with a choice of means for accomplishing his
purpose. Each of these varying available means has its own
peculiar advantages and disadvantages, and may, or may not,
be the one best adapted to a particular situation. Designing a
conveying instrument suitable for effectuating a conveyor's
intention in these respects requires a familiarity with the various
legal tools the law affords for accomplishing these purposes;
an ability to select the one best adapted to the end desired; and
the requisite skill in legal draftsmanship to incorporate such
intention into the conveying instrument so emphatically that
doubt can not arise as to its true nature.
The jrposes served by annexing conditions subsequent,
special limitations or executory limitations to fee simple estates
in either real or personal property, thus converting such estates
'Possessory fees simple defeasible are alone considered herein.
2This article is a condensation of one chapter from a treatise In
the course of preparation by the writer.
* Prof. of Law, Univ. of Detroit, School of Law, Graduate, Western
State Teachers College, Kalamazoo 1916; Ph.B. 1919; J.D. 1921;
Graduate Student Political Science 1923-25, Univ. of Chicago. Admitted
to practice in Illinois in 1922. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Detroit, since
1925.
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into fees simple defeasible, 3 are, in the main, similar. Never-
theless, in any given situation, a condition may be preferable
to a limitation, a condition subsequent to one precedent, etc.
Other available legal means for accomplishing these purposes,
with varying degrees of effectiveness, include trusts, covenants,
restrictions, liens, mortgages, disabling restraints, etc. A general
knowledge of the outstanding legal characteristics of these
various mechanisms furnishes the more significant clues for
selecting the best available means in any given case.
Where a condition subsequent is annexed to a fee simple
estate, title to the property passes immediately and the convey-
ance becomes effective, subject to being revested, after a breach of
the condition, in the conveyor, or his successor in interest, at
their option. Once a breach occurs, revesting title is normally
a comparatively simple procedure, though, in any given case,
a possessory action may be necessary for regaining possession
of the property. This power to terminate the estate of the one
required to perform, or to abstain from, specified acts furnishes
a very formidable weapon for compelling such performance or
abstinence; and the ease and speed with which a forfeiture may
be perfected after a breach of the condition adds to the
desirability of such conditions. The person entitled to forfeit
is permitted, at his election, to waive continuing or successive
breaches of the condition, and to continue the -estate conveyed
as though no breach had occurred, and this adds another sub-
stantial advantage to conditions subsequent. A condition sub-
sequent is not limited in its duration by the rule against
perpetnities, and consequently the use of such condition is an
effective means for requiring or prohibiting acts over an extended
or indefinite period of time.
However, conditions subsequent are not without their dis-
advantages. They are loathed by the law, are anathema to
equity, and can expect no favors. Courts are apt to be generous
to a fault in finding that no breach has occurred, and equity
may often intervene to obstruct a forfeiture. Where the person
to benefit from the observance of a condition subsequent is one
other than the owner of the power of termination, such person
is powerless to compel observance of the condition if the owner
2 On the nature of fees simple defeasible, see Restatement, Property,
(1936) secs. 16, 23, 24 and 25.
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of the power is disinclined to act. Where the value of the
property subject to forfeiture falls below the value of the
observance of the condition, a forfeiture may be desired by the
owner of the property. As forfeiture is the only remedy for
the breach of a condition subsequent, its effectiveness as a threat
will then disappear, and the owner of the power of termination
must be satisfied with regaining his property.
Much of what has been said in the preceding paragraphs
anent conditions subsequent might be reiterated for special
limitations. There is, however, one essential difference between
the two which might prove to be either an advantage or a dis-
advantage in any given case. Special limitations operate
automatically to revest title upon the happening of the specified
event. Consequently, it would seem that the doctrine of waiver
could not in strictness well be applied to them. In many cases
a conveyor might prefer to ignore lapses in performance on the
part of the conveyee, but if the law of special limitations be
strictly applied, title reverts when the defeasing event occurs,
and this might occur without the knowledge and against the
wishes of both parties. Fixing the exact moment when title re-
vested for the consequent fixing of dower, creditors' rights, etc.
might become of concern in any given case. In practice, special
limitations are confined largely to continuing some direction
over the uses to which the conveyed property might be subjected.
Executory limitations in the form of conditions subsequent
partake largely of the advantages and. disadvantages of con-
ditions subsequent aad special limitations. Operating
automatically, as do special limitations, the doctrine of waiver
can not in strictness be applied to them. Where the one to
benefit from their observance is one other than the owner of the
shifting interest, they suffer from the same short-comings as
do conditions subsequent in affording him protection.
Executory limitations in the form of conditions precedent
differ essentially in that title does not vest in the conveyce
until performance of the required acts or the happening of the
specified events. This presents disadvantages in cases where a
conveyee might be unwilling to perform over a protracted
period before receiving title. Executory limitations are
governed in their duration by the permissible period of the rule
against perpetuities, consequently they are unavailable when it
FEEs SIMPE DEFEAsmLE; PURPOSES; UTILITY
is desired that their observance should continue for some period
not sanctioned by the rule. They are confined largely to
directing the course of property ownership, but are also employed
as coercive devices. Because executory limitations operate to
transfer title to one other than the conveyor upon the happening
of the defeasing event they are employed much more extensively
in wills than in deeds.
I. As SfCuRITY DEVICES, FOR SECURING THE PAYMENT OF M NEY
OR THE PERFORMANCE OF SERVICES.
A. The Payment of Annuities to a Grantor.
Where a grantor of a fee simple estate in land desires to
secure to himself the payment of an annuity by the grantee,
perhaps the best of the accepted methods to accomplish such
purpose is to make such payment a condition subsequent to the
title conveyed. 4 A condition subsequent will normally prove
highly effective, either as a threat to compel payment, or as a
means of securing a return of the land upon a failure to make
the payments. Such a condition should not prove seriously
objectionable to the grantee, especially where such annuity is
all, or a substantial portion, of the consideration he pays for
the land, and where the possession he enjoys is in value the
equivalent of, or greater than, the annuity payments. Forfeiture
is not a harsh remedy in these cases. The grantee need not
breach the condition, and even though his estate be forfeited, if
the use of the land be equal to or greater in value than the
payments he has made he has lost only his anticipation of
ownership. Where the annuity payments exceed the rental
value of the land, a grantee risks an actual loss if the condition
be breached, and he may be more loathe to accept the con-
veyance.
A grantor might employ a special limitation here, con-
veying the land to the grantee in fee simple so long as the
'As illustrative chses, see: Kampman v. Kampman, 98 Ark. 328,
135 S. W. 905 (1911); Chalker v. Chalker, 1 Conn. 79, 6 Am. Dec. 206
(1814); Denham v. Walker, 93 Ga. 497, 21 S. E. 102 (1893); Powell v.
Powell, 335 Ill. 533, 167 N. . 802 (1929); Royal v. Altman & Taylor
Co., 116 Ind. 424, 19 N. B. 202, 2 L. R. A- 526 (1888); Minn. Threshing
Mach. Co. v. Hanson, 101 Minn. 260, 112 N. W. 217, 118 Am. St. Rep.
623 (1907); Brown v. Tilley, 25 R. I. 579, 57 Atl. 380 (1904); Berryman
v. Schumacher, 67 Tex. 312, 3 S. W. 46 (1887); Delong v. Delong,
56 Wis. 514, 14 N. W. 591 (1883).
L. J.-5
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annuity payments are promptly met. However, special
limitations would have no advantage over conditions subsequent,
and they would be open to the additional objection that they
operate automatically. If strictly enforced a delinquency in
any one payment for however short a time would revest title in
the grantor, probably often contrary to his intentions. In these
cases, the grantee is normally some person close to the grantor,
and the grantor might well prefer to waive excusable
delinquencies in the payments. Moreover, a grantor and grantee,
uninformed in the law, might well assume that the grantor
has the legal power to waive delinquencies, and discover, too
late perhaps, that title had shifted to the grantor, contrary to the
expectations of both parties.
Payment of the annuity may be made a lien or charge upon
the land, rather than a condition subsequent to the title.5
However, this may often prove less effective than a condition
subsequent as a threat to compel payment, and may be more
cumbersome to enforce in case of a failure to meet payments.
To the extent that equity may be more generous in the case of
a lien or charge in permitting the grantee to remedy a default
in payment, to that extent he may be more inclined to grow
careless in making payment promptly. Perfecting a forfeiture
for the breach of a condition subsequent annexed to a fee simple
estate in land is a comparatively simple procedure. In the case
of a lien or charge the legal procedure for enforcing such a right
may be more expensive, complicated and dilatory than the
perfection of a forfeiture. Furthermore, there is a likelihood
that equity might be more loathe to interfere with the perfection
of a forfeiture, than with the enforcment of a lien or charge, by
permitting past breaches to be absolved by delinquent payments.
A lien or charge may have an advantage over a condition sub-
sequent in that it may be so created as to impose a personal
obligation upon the original grantee. This, however, would
be apt to become of importance only when, because of the
shrinkage in the value of the land, the grantor would prefer
the annuity payment to a return of the land.
While a condition precedent might well be employed to
OAs illustrative cases, see: Gallagher v. Herbert, 117 I11. 160,
7 N. E. 511 (1886); Doescher v. Doescher, 61 Minn. 326, 63 N. W. 736
(1895).
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secure annuity payments to a grantor, this might prove so
objectionable to the prospective grantee, at least if possession,
as well as ownership, be denied to him until performance has
been completed, that he might refuse to accept the conveyance,
not wishing to risk a loss of past performances, by virtue of an
inability to continue future payments. Furthermore, a grantor
in cases of this character, usually wishes to relieve himself of the
control and management of the land, as well as to secure the
benefit of an annuity to himself, and this he accomplishes only
as he relinquishes the possession and enjoyment of the land to
the grantee. Furthermore, a grantee might be more inclined
to make improvements upon land to which he has present title,
though such title might be later divested, than he would upon
land the title to which was still in abeyance.
A grantor may be satisfied with a mere personal covenant
on the part of the grantee to make the annual payments. How-
ever, this permits the grantee to transfer the land free from any
liability for the payments. If the grantee then becomes
financially irresponsible, the grantor has no means of enforcing
payment. A well conceived intention on the part of the grantee
to perform faithfully may also be frustrated by his death.
Where an owner of land desires all, or substantially all,
of the income from the land, and at the same time to relieve him-
self of the burden of its control and management, he may
prefer to place such land in trust with himself as the beneficiary.
But usually where an annuity is desired, the owner wishes an
immediate conveyance to the grantee, and the interposition of
a trustee might prove objectionable to him. A present outright
conveyance may be due to a desire to presently benefit the
grantee as well as to relinquish the control and management of
the land.
Where personal property is involved, the considerations are
substantially similar. However, due to, the nature of personal
property, since it requires greater care for its preservation, and
affords greater opportunity for its dissipation, a trust may be
preferable here.
B. The Paymenzt of Annuities to One Other Than the Conveyor.
Here the use of a condition subsequent has one distinct
disadvantage. It may lose much of its effectiveness in this
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situation, since the one entitled to perfect the forfeiture may
be disinclined to act, and the law provides no compulsion for
him. Here a lien or charge may be preferable, or by the use
of an executory limitation, title to the land may be made to
shift either to the annuitant, or another, upon a delinquency
in payment. In other respects the considerations of the preced-
ing section will have a substantial application here.
C. The Payment of Legacies by a Devisee.
The methods normally employed in a will to secure the
payment of legacies by a devisee are either to make payment a
condition precedent,6  or a condition subsequent 7  to the
vesting of title, or to impose a lien or charges upon the
devise for securing payment. A lien or charge is normally the
more effective means of fulfilling the testator's intention in
this respect. The devisee becomes the immediate owner of the
land upon the death of the testator, and the legatee is normally
sufficiently protected to assure receipt of the legacy, the two
things the testator desires. Though the devisee refuses to
accept the devise, the legacy remains as a charge against the
land. If the devisee lacks sufficient cash to make a prompt
payment of the legacy, he, in all probabilities, will be able to
borrow upon the security of the land.
To make the payment of the legacy a condition precedent
to the vesting of title in the devisee may often prove most
unsatisfactory. It is true that the condition furnishes a strong
incentive for payment, as the devisee receives no title to the land
until the condition is performed. However, if the devisee lacks
sufficient cash to pay the legacy promptly, he may experience
difficulty in borrowing upon the security of land to which he
has, as yet, no title. Also, the devisee may, for one reason or
another, prefer to forego the devise, rather than to pay the
6As illustrative cases, see: Nevius v. Gorley, 95 Ill. 206 (1880);
Fairview Lodge v. Gaddis, 296 Ill. 570, 130 N. U. 315 (1921); Stearns
v. Godfrey, 16 Me. 158 (1839).
7As illustrative cases, see: Wheeler v. Walker, 2 Conn. 196, 7
Am. Dec. 264 (1817); Nowak v. Dombrowski, 267 Ill. 103, 107 N. D. 807
(1915); Scholl v. Muscovitz, 170 Wis. 97, 174 N. E. 463 (1919).8 As illustrative cases, see: Ditchey v. Lee, 167 Ind. 267, 78 N. B.
972 (1906); Low v. Ramsey, 135 Ky. 333, 122 S. W. 167 (1909);
Cunningham v. Parker, 146 N. Y. 29, 40 N. E. 635 (1895); Beck v.
Bailey, 32 Ohio App. 423, 168 N. E. 220 (1929).
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legacy even though he is able to do so. The testator's intention
is then completely thwarted, as both devisee and legatee receive
nothing under this provision of the will.
Similarly, making payment of the legacy a condition sub-
sequent to the title of the devisee, so that upon a failure in pay-
ment the devisee's title may be divested, may often prove in-
effective to accomplish the testator's purpose. While such
condition subsequent may furnish a strong incentive for per-
formance, if the devisee does refuse, or is unable to pay the
legacy, the heirs of the testator may forfeit the devisee's estate
and entitle themselves to the land, in which case neither the
devisee or the legatee receive anything under this provision of
the will. On the other hand, the heirs may refuse to perfect a
forfeiture of the land for a failure on the part of the devisee
to pay the legacy, and thus the devisee retains the land without
paying the legacy, and the legatee receives nothing, neither
of which the testator would have desired. The testator might
obviate the possibility of refusal to forfeit upon the part of his
heirs by using an executory limitation and thus shift title from
the devisee automatically upon his failure to pay the legacy
within a prescribed time.
D. Compelling the Grantee to Support the Grantor.
Where it is desired that the grantee of land furnish support
to the grantor, this purpose is normally accomplished by con-
veying the land in fee simple subject to a condition subsequent,9
or to make the vesting of the title in the grantee subject to
a condition precedent,' 0 or to accept a personal covenant
from the grantee that he will furnish the support,"- or to
'As illustrative cases, see: First Nat. Bank v. McIntosh, 201 Ala.
649, 79 So. 121 (1918); Goodwin v. Tyson, 167 Ark. 396, 268 S. W. 15
(1925); Holmes v. Brooks, 84 Conn. 512, 80 Atl. 773 (1911); Johnson
v. Tullis, 152 Ga. 232, 109 S. El. 659 (1921); Phillips v. Gannon, 246
Ill. 98, 92 N. E. 616 (1910); Gushwa v. Gushwa, 93 Ind. App. 68, 177
N. D. 366 (1931); Martin v. Adams, 171 Ky. 246, 188 S. W. 318 (1916);
Blum v. Bush, 86 Mich. 206, 49 N. W. 142 (1891); Tough v. Netsch,
83 N. H. 374, 142 AtL. 702 (1928); Huntley v. ofcBrayer, 169 N. C. 75,
85 S. E. 213 (1915); Alford v. Alford, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 245, 21 S. W. 283(1892).10As illustrative cases, see: Culy v. Upham, 135 Mich. 131, 97 N. W.
405 (1903); Brennan v. Brennan, 185 Mass. 560, 71 N. E. 80 (1904);
Fisher v. Fisher, 80 Neb. 145, 113 N. W. 1005 (1907); In re Sicourmat's
Est., 161 Wash. 406, 296 Pac. 1047 (1931).
'uAs illustrative cases, see: Brand v. Power, 110 Ga. 522, 36 S. U.
53 (1900); O'Neill v. Caples, 257 Ill. 526, 101 N. . 50 (1913); Kohnke
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make the furnishing of support a lien or charge against the
land. 12 A grantor in stipulating for support and maintenance
for himself usually prefers compliance by the grantee personally.
Normally, the grantee is a member of the grantor's immediate
family in whom the grantor reposes confidence, and upon whose
natural affection he relies for fitting and proper care and sup-
port. Further, the grantor in such cases, because of advancing
years, wishes, besides providing for his future support, to be
relieved from the active management of the conveyed property.
A power in the grantor to forfeit the grantee's estate in
the conveyed property upon a failure on the part of the grantee
to perform his agreement is most apt to accomplish the grantor's
purpose. The fear of losing the land conveyed furnishes the
grantee with sufficient incentive to perform properly. Even
though a forfeiture be perfected for non-performance this
normally works no undue hardship upon the grantee. Though
he has complied with the terms of the condition for a considerable
period of time, and even through no fault of his own he is
prevented from continuing, the loss of the conveyed property
usually deprives him of nothing more than his anticipations.
More often than not the grantee has paid no consideration for
the property other than the agreement to furnish support, or if
consideration be paid, it is adjusted accordingly. Though the
grantee may lose the value of the support he has contributed,
nevertheless he has had the enjoyment of the property while
furnishing such support, which enjoyment is normally of greater
value than the support furnished.
In making a choice between a condition subsequent and a
condition precedent, the former is the better selection under
ordinary circumstances. Giving the grantee a present estate
in the land relieves the grantor from the responsibility of the
management of the property, and enables the grantee to better
control and protect it. It provides the grantee with a greater
v. Kohnke, 298 Mo. 497, 250 S. W. 53 (1923); Dunn v. Ryan, 82 N. J. E.
356, 88 Atl. 1025 (1913); Sisk v. Randon, Tex. Civ. App. 35 S. W.
(2d) 1082 (1930); Lowman v. Crawford, 99 Va. 688, 40 S. E. 17 (1901).
'-As illustrative cases, see: Van Horne v. Mercer, 29 Ind. App. 277,
64 N. E. 531 (1902); Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 91 Mich. 394, 51 N. W.
1058 (1892); Childs v. Rue, 84 Minn. 323, 87 N. W. 918 (1901); Helms
v. Helms, 135 N. C. 164, 47 S. E. 415 (1904); Carney v. Carney, 138
Tenn. 67, 200 S. W. 517 (1918); Pownal v. Taylor, 37 Va. 172, 34 Am.
Dec. 725 (1839).
FEEs SlmP'E DEFEASiBIJ,; PuRPosEs; UTILITy
incentive for accepting the property and furnishing the support.
It seems manifestly unjust to ask a grantee to furnish support
over a protracted period of time without the benefit of enjoying
the land, and without acquiring a substantial property interest
therein.
A lien here is subject to the same objection that beset it
as a security device for forcing payment of annuities and
legacies. It may prove more cumbersome of enforcement than
a condition subsequent, and may be subject to equitable relief
to a greater extent than a condition subsequent. It has the
further disadvantage that it may not secure personal perform-
ance from the grantee, but merely the value of the support.
A personal covenant for support on the part of the grantee
may provide insufficient protection for the grantor. While the
grantee still owns the land a court may set aside the deed on
one or another of various equitable grounds, but if the grantee
transfers the land, the grantor is left unprotected if the grantee
becomes financially irresponsible. In the exceptional case, where
the land through depreciation becomes of less value than the
support to be furnished, a covenant may be more effective than
a condition subsequent, i. e. a personal judgment for damages
may in a given case be more valuable to the grantor than a
return of the land.
While a special limitation might be used, it is normally
undesirable, especially where the grantee is closely related to the
grantor, as the grantor may wish to waive occasional lapses in
performance. An executory limitation is subject to the same
objection, and with the additional disadvantage, that though it
might be a sufficient threat, if a breach occurs title shifts from
the grantee thus punishing him but provides no means for
enforcing the support unless some arrangement be continued
with reference to the executory interests.
E. Compelling S'upport of One Other Than a Grantor.
Where a conveyor wishes a conveyee of land to furnish sup-
port to one other than the conveyor, the same means as he
might employ for compelling support to himself, the condition
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subsequent, 13 the condition precedent, 14 the lien,' 5  or the
covenant' 6 are available to him. Where a grantor wishes to use
a conveyance as a means of compelling support to be furnished to
one other than himself, the use of a condition subsequent presents
some advantages and some disadvantages in addition to those
mentioned in the preceding section. The grantor has the ad-
ditional advantage that if for any reason he desires the support
to cease, he may waive any breach, or possibly release the grantee
from the condition. To this extent the use of a condition sub-
sequent is a distinct disadvantage to the beneficiary of the sup-
port. A disadvantage from the standpoint of the grantor is
the fact that, if he should die before performance be completed,
his heirs or devisees may refuse to enforce the condition, leaving
the beneficiary helpless. A lien might in some cases be more
acceptable here.
Where support is sought to be secured through a devise, a
condition subsequent has additional disadvantages. The heir
may not care to forfeit the devise if support fails, and if he does
forfeit this does not carry out the testator's primary intention
of securing support. While the devisee may thus be deprived
of the property, the beneficiary is helpless to compel support.
A condition precedent in these situations may be so objectionable
to the devisee, especially if the value of the property be small,
and prospects for a continuance of the support over a long
period of time are imminent, that he will refuse the devise, thus
depriving the beneficiary of the support. Furthermore, the one
entitled to the support may refuse to receive it, thus depriving
the devisee of his devise through impossibility of performing the
condition precedent. Perhaps here in the ordinary case, a lien
or charge will be a more substantial means of carrying out the
testator's intention, or the testator may prefer to employ an
executory limitation shifting title to a number of persons suc-
cessively, if any one prior in turn fails to furnish the support.
23 As illustrative cases, see: Winn v. Tabernacle Infirmary, 135 Ga.
380, 69 S. E. 557 (1910); Cross v. Carson, 8 Blackf. 138, 44 Am. Dec.
742 (1846); DeConick v. DeConick, 154 Mich. 187, 117 N. W. 570
(1908); Merrill v. Emery, 27 Mass. 507 (1830); Burdis v. Burdis,
96 Va. 81, 30 S. E. 468 (1898).
"GAs an illustrative case, see: In re Dempsey, 55 N. Y. S. 427 (1898).
15As an illustrative case, see: Outland v. Outland, 118 N. 0. 138,
23 S. E. 972 (1896).
1As an illustrative case, see: Campau v. Chene, 1 Mich. 400 (1850).
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F. Securing Care for a Grave.
Annexing a condition subsequent in a conveyance of
property is an effective means of securing care for a grave, but
it is subject to the disadvantage that those succeeding to the
conveyor's power of termination may be disinclined to act, or
the lapse of time may make it difficult to determine who is
entitled to act. Since conditions subsequent axe not within the
rule against perpetuities, their duration may be continued in-
definitely. A condition precedent is not a very satisfactory
method of securing a succession of acts over a protracted period
of time, and might well be so objectionable to a conveyee that he
would refuse the conveyance. A condition precedent to be valid
must be limited in its duration to the permissible period of the
rule against perpetuities. An executory limitation might well
divest the first conveyee of his property thus providing an in-
centive for him to perform, but upon such divestment the neces-
sity for performance will cease, unless provision be made for
successive divestments and alternative gifts upon each conveyee's
failure to perform. The duration of an executory limitation must
be confined to the permissible period of the rule against
perpetuities. Today in most American jurisdictions, by statute
where necessary, private trusts for the care of graves are
exempted from the rule against perpetuities, and the use of a
trust, normally with a corporate trustee, is now the generally
accepted means for securing the care and maintenance of a
grave, some provision being necessary for securing performance
of the trust.
II. As CoERcr m DEvicEs FOR CONTROLLING CONDUCT.
A. Restraining Marriage.
As a matter of public policy, the law prescribes certain
limits beyond which a conveyor of property may not proceed,
through the instrumentality of such property, in restraining
the marriage of the conveyee. Thus, a total, or a substantially
total, restraint upon marriage is forbidden, while certain partial
restraints, or general restraints upon remarriage, are permis-
sible. Within these permissible limits, it is obvious that in
subjecting the property conveyed in fee simple to defeasance
upon a prohibited marriage, a very effective means of in-
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fluencing conveyees in this respect is afforded. Consequently,
it is very common to find conveyors availing themselves of such
legal mechanisms as special limitations,17 conditions subsequent,' 8
and executory limitations"19 in seeking to restrain marriages
deemed objectionable by them. In these cases there is not a
great deal of choice between the methods generally employed.
There may be one objection to a condition subsequent in that the
successor in interest to the conveyor may in a given case refuse
to exercise his power of termination. In general, a special
limitation if the grantor desire the -property to revest in himself
or his heirs, or an executory limitation if it is desired that title
vest in another, in case the conveyee marry contrary to the
terms of the conveyance, are the preferable means.
While a general restraint upon marriage designed to pro-
mote celibacy is normally declared void because opposed to
public policy, it is permissible to convey property to one, their
estate in such property to terminate upon marriage, where the
objective sought is to furnish support until marriage, or to
prevent the donor's bounty from being enjoyed by some one
VAs illustrative cases, see: Bennett v. Packer, 70 Conn. 357, 39
Ati.. 739 (1898); Brown v. Harmon, 73 Ind. 412 (1881); Staack v.
Detterding, 182 Ia. 582, 161 N. W. 44 (1917); Hinkle v. Hinkle, 168 Ky.
286, 181 S. W. 1116 (1916); Winget v. Gay, 325 Mo. 368, 28 S. W. (2d)
999 (1930); Anderson v. Anderson, 119 Neb. 381, 229 N. W. 124 (1910);
In re Kidd's Est., 293 Pa. 21, 141 Atl. 644 (1928); Squier v. Harvey,
16 R. 1. 226, 14 Atl. 862 (1888); Haring v. Shelton, 103 Tex. 10, 122
S. W. 13 (1909).
I "As illustrative cases, see: Glass v. Johnson, 297 Ill. 149, 130 N. D.
473 (1921); Crawford v. Thompson, 91 Ind. 266, 46 Am. Rep. 598
(1883); Randall v. Marble, 69 Me. 310, 31 Am. Rep. 281 (1879); Turner
v. Evans, 134 Md. 238, 106 Atl. 617 (1919); Otis v. Prince, 76 Mass. 581
(1858); Hogan v. Curtin, 88 N. Y. 162, 42 Am. Rep. 244 (1882); Card
v. Mason, 169 N. C. 507, 86 S. E. 302 (1915).
19As illustrative cases, see: Logan v. Hammond, 155 Ga. 514, 117
S. E. 428 (1923); Glass v. Johnson, 297 Ill. 149, 130 N. E. 473 (1921);
Anderson v. Crawford, 202 Ia. 207, 207 N. W. 571 (1926); Lehfart v.
Scharre, 143 Ky. 849, 137 S. W. 775 (1911); Prindible v. Prindible,
186 Ky. 280, 216 S. W. 583 (1919); Walker v. Walker's Admr., 239 Ky.
501, 39 S. W. (2d) 930 (1931); Ostrander v. Muskegon Finance Co.,
230 Mich 310, 202 N. W. 951 (1925); Knost v. Knost, 229 Mo. 170,
129 S. W. 665 (1910); Bryan v. Harper, 177 N. C. 308, 98 S. E. 822(1919); Overton v. Lea, 108 Tenn. 505, 68 S. W. 250 (1902); Meek v.
Fox, 118 Va. 774, 88 S. D. 161 (1916).
As illustrative cases where an executory limitation has been
annexed to a determinable fee, see: Shaw v. Shaw, 115 Ia. 193, 88 N. W.
327 (1901); Hinkle v. Hinkle, 168 Ky. 286, 181 S. W. 1116 (1916);
Pringle v. Dunkley, 22 Miss. 16 (1850); Winget v. Gay, 325 Mo. 368,
28 S. W. (2d) 999 (1930); Smith v. Creech, 186 N. C. 187, 119 S. E. 3
(1923).
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other than the donee. Due to the terminology normally employed
in their creation, a condition subsequent seems more readily
designed for expressing a purpose of restraining marriage, while
a special limitation seems better adapted for expressing an
intention to provide a maintenance until marriage. Conse-
quently, it has been frequently asserted that if a provision in
a conveyance which unreasonably restrains marriage is construed
as a condition subsequent, it is void, while if it is construed as
a special limitation, it is valid, and that the courts will attempt
so to construe such provisions as to validate them whenever
possible. Such a position seems untenable, when it is considered
that a special limitation may be employed just as readily for
the purpose of discouraging marriage as a condition subsequent.
It is perhaps nearer correct to consider that the validity of such
provisions is determined by their purpose, rather than by their
nature, and that in the absence of any evidence as to their
purpose, it will be presumed that a special limitation was
employed primarily for furnishing maintenance until marriage,
while a condition subsequent was employed primarily to restrain
marriage.
In drafting a conveyance transferring property to one until
marriage, with the intention of furnishing that person with
maintenance during the interim while they remain single, and
with no intention of restraining marriage, a special limitation
may be safer to employ than a condition subsequent, but the
purpose of the conveyance should not be left to a court's con-
clusion drawn from the technical nature of the defeasing pro-
vision, but such purpose should be set forth clearly and un-
mistakingly in terminology employed primarily for that purpose.
Even though the major purpose of a defeasing provision be to
restrain marriage, this purpose may be neatly camouflaged
under an expressed intention of furnishing maintenance, and an
otherwise invalid purpose thus be effectuated.
It is not uncommon for a testator to desire to reduce the
amount of property devised or bequeathed to his wife, if she
should remarry. He may be prompted in this by a desire to
restrain her remarriage, or by a feeling that her newly acquired
husband should be primarily responsible for her support. The
law permits a husband to impose such an impediment to his
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wife's remarriage regardless of his motive, and to accomplish
this purpose an executory limitation is regularly employed in
the drafting of the will.
B. Inducing the Disruption of the Familial Relation.
Public policy generally opposes the inciting of a spouse to
secure a divorce, or to live separate from the other spouse, by
offering property as an inducement, but where such inducement
is offered, a condition precedent requiring the conveyee to
secure a divorce or a separation before title shall vest is the
means generally employed.20  A condition precedent is
ordinarily the best available means in these situations, since
the conveyor does not desire the title to vest until the divorce
or separation has taken place. However, it has some dis-
advantages unless extreme care is exercised in setting forth the
terms of the condition. Where property is conveyed subject to
a condition precedent, the title vests as soon as the terms of the
condition are satisfied. Where a divorce is demanded by the
condition, it is easy to determine when the condition is satisfied.
Where a separation is all that is required it is more difficult
to determine when title should vest, unless the terms of the
condition are explicit in this respect. A more serious drawback
in the use of a condition precedent is that once title vests it can
not later be divested even though the prohibited acts later
occur. To be completely efficacious some provision should be
made for divesting title after it has once vested, if the parties
should again remarry, or live together, as the case may be.
Where it is desired to continue a separation already begun, a
condition subsequent may be employed.
A distinction must be drawn between those conditions
annexed to a conveyance of property, the primary purpose of
which is to induce a divorce or separation, and which are
generally recognized as void, and those provisions the primary
purpose of which is not to induce a divorce or separation, but
to provide a maintenance for a divorced spouse, or to provide a
"'As illustrative cases, see: Brizendine v. American Trust and
Savings Bank, 211 Ala. 694, 101 So. 618 (1924); Daboll v. Moon, 88 Conn.
387, 91 Atl. 646 (1914); Ransdell v. Boston, 172 Ill. 439, 50 N. E. 111
(1898); Baker v. Hickman, 127 Kans. 340, 273 Pac. 480 (1929); Conant
v. Stone, 176 Mich. 654, 143 N. W. 39 (1913); Hood v. St. Louis Trust
Co., 334 Mo. 404, 66 S. W. (2d) 837 (1933); Hawke v. Euyart, 30 Neb.
149, 46 N. W. 422 (1890); McKinley v. Martin, 226 Pa. 550, 75 Atl. 734(1910).
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gift for one if they are enjoying a single status at the death of
the conveyor, and which are generally recognized as valid. Con-
siderable care must be exercised in drafting conditions in these
cases, so that the valid purpose will be clearly and explicitly set
forth, and not easily confused with an intention to induce a
divorce or separation.
C. Prohibiting W111 Contests.
Here, the testator invariably desires that the title to the
property shall pass to the devisees and legatees at his death,
to be divested as to the shares of any who may contest the
will. Consequently, a condition subsequent 21 or an executory
limitation2 2 is normally employed depending upon whether the
testator desires his heirs, or others, to receive the forfeited
estate. It is preferable, in any case, to employ an executory
limitation and thus make an express gift over. In the absence
6f an express gift over, the law is not clear whether the
testator's heirs, or the residuary devisees and legatees, in case
the will contains a residuary clause, are the ones entitled to
the forfeited property. If the heirs are found to be entitled,
the law is not clear whether their interest is that of a possibility
of reverter or a power of termination which requires an act of
forfeiture.
D. Influencing Moral Conduct.
One making a conveyance of property may desire to qualify
the conveyance in such manner as to influence the conveyee in
his moral conduct. If such a conveyee is already possessed of
exemplary habits, a condition subsequent, 23 or an executory
limitation24 annexed to the conveyance may be impressive in
-- As illustrative cases, see: Harber v. Harber, 158 Ga. 274, 123
S. E. 114 (1924); Ayres' Adm'r. v. Ayers, 212 Ky. 400, 279 S. W. 647
(1926); Williams v. Williams, 83 Tenn. 438 (1885); Dutterer v. Logan,
103 W. Va. 216, 137 S. E. 1 (1927).
2As illustrative cases, see: Donegan v. Wade, 70 Ala. 501 (1881);
Moorman v. Louisville Trust Co., 181 Ky. 30, 203 S. W. 856 (1918);
Chambers v. Chambers, 322 Mo. 1086, 18 S. W. (2d) 30 (1929); Rouse
v. Branch, 91 S. C. 111, 74 S. E. 133 (1912); Tate v. Camp, 147 Tenn.
137, 245 S. W. 839 (1922); Massie v. Massie, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 617,
118 S. W. 219 (1909); Fifield v. Van Wyck's Exr, 94 ,Va. 557, 27 S. E.
466 (1897).
2 As illustrative cases, see: Sherrard v. Sloan, 117 Neb. 776, 223
N. W. 17 (1929); Stewart v. Workman, 85 W. Va. 695, 102 S. E. 474
(1920).
1"As an illustrative case, see: Forsyth v. Forsyth, 46 N. 3. E. 400,
19 AtI. 119 (1890).
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influencing him to continue. If it is desired to improve his moral
conduct, it is usually preferable to withhold the vesting of title
to the property until reformation is completed, and a condition
precedent is normally employed. 25  If a condition precedent is
employed it should do more than merely require a reformation.
It should require leading an exemplary life for a time sufficient
to reasonably insure permanence, or a provision should be in-
corporated for forfeiting title upon a recurrence of the pro-
hibited delinquencies
E. Insuring Competency in Property Management.
A conveyor of property often desires that the conveyance
shall not become completely effective until such time as the
conveyee shall attain such matured age as will offer some
assurance of competent management of the property. The title
to the conveyed property may be made contingent, by means of
a condition precedent, upon the conveyee attaining a prescribed
age, 26 or title may be made to pass when the conveyance becomes
effective with control and possession withheld until a designated
age is attained.2 7 The choice here centers about the question
whether the conveyee shall become the owner of the property
only if he attains a given age, or whether he shall become the
owner when the conveyance becomes effective, with control and
possession postponed until a given age, usually maturity. The
determining factor in influencing a choice is the disposition to
be made of the property upon the premature death of the
conveyee. Extreme caution need be exercised that the conveyor
-As illustrative cases, see: Holmes v. Conn. Trust and Safe
Deposit Co., 92 Conn. 507, 103 Atl. 640 (1918); Cassem v. Kennedy,
147 Ill. 660, 35 N. E. 738 (1893); Markham v. Huffo rd, 123 Mich. 505,
52 N. W. 222 (1900); Kerens v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 283 Mo. 601,
233 S. W. 645 (1920); Hawke v. Euyart, 30 Neb. 149, 46 N. W. 422(1890); Campbell v. Clough, 71 N. H. 149, 51 Atl. 668 (1901); In re
Steven's Est., 164 Pa. 209, 30 Atl. 243 (1880); Starke v. Conde, 100
Wis. 633, 76 N. W. 600 (1898).
"As illustrative cases, see: Hickey v. Costello, 80 Colo. 461, 251
Pac. 595 (1927); Ross v. Ware's Admr., 131 Ky. 828, 116 S. W. 241
1909); Webb v. Webb, 92 Md. 101, 48 Atl. 95 (1900); In re Grothe's
Est., 237 Pa. 262, 85 Atl. 141 (1912).
=
7As illustrative cases, see: Brizendine v. American Trust and
Savings Bank, 211 Ala. 694, 101 So. 618 (1924); State v. Main, 87 Conn.
175, 87 Atl. 38 (1913); Silvers v. Canary, 114 Ind. 129, 16 N. E. 166
(1888); Hall v. Ayers' Guardian, 105 S. W. 911 (1907); In re Vander-
warker's Est., 81 Minn. 197, 83 N. W. 538 (1900); Cammann v. Bailey,
210 N. Y. 19, 103 N. E. 824 (1913); In re O'Brien's Will, 173 Wis. 41,
180 N. W. 141 (1920).
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make a definite choice which is incorporated into the conveying
instrument so clearly that doubt will not arise. If it is desired
that title be postponed until the specified age is attained,
provision should be made for an alternative disposition upon
the premature death of the conveyee, and the rule against
perpetuities must be satisfied.
F. Miscellaneos-Inculcating Thrift-Encouraging Accept-
ance or Renunciation of a Given Religion-Selecting a
Residence-Adopting a Name-Learning a
Trade-Etc.
Conveyances of property are often qualified for the purpose
of influencing the conveyee in various ways, such as accumulat-
ing a designated amount of property by his own efforts ;28 accept-
ing or renouncing a given religion -;29 living with a designated
person,:'o or in a given locality ;31 changing his name ;32 learning
a trade ;33 etc. Normally, in this class of cases it is desired that
the title to the property shall not vest until the purposes of the
conveyance are accomplished, and a condition precedent is
employed. Such condition should be broad enough in its scope
as to clearly indicate the desires of the conveyor, and provision
should be made for an alternative disposition of the property if
the condition be not fulfilled. The rule against perpetuities must
be satisfied.
" As illustrative cases, see: Horrocks v. Basham, 129 Ark. 216,
213 S. W. 372 (1919); In re Scott's Will, 204 N. Y. S. 478 (1924);
Reynolds v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 201 N. C. 267, 159 N. E. 416
(1931).
2 As illustrative cases, see: Kenyon v. See, 94 N. Y. 563 (1884);
In re Devlin's Trusts, 284 Pa. 11, 130 Atl. 238 (1925); Magee v.
O'Neill, 19 S. C. 170, 45 Am. Rep. 765 (1883); Maddox v. Maddox,
52 Va. 804 (1854).
I'As illustrative cases, see: Johnson v. Warren, 74 Mich. 491,
42 N. W. 74 (1889); Gilliland v. Bredin, 63 Pa. St. 393 (1869); Perry
v. Brown, 34 R. L 203, 83 Atl. 8 (1912); In re Hill, 215 Wis. 72, 253
N. W. 787 (1934).
"'As illustrative cases, see: Grindem v. Grindem, 89 Ia. 295,
56 N. W. 505 (1893); Jenkins v. Horwitz, 92 Md. 34, 47 Atl. 1022
(1900); Pitchford v. Limer, 139 N. C. 13, 51 S. E. 789 (1905).
22As illustrative cases, see: Holmes v. Conn. Trust and Safe Dep.
Co., 92 Conn. 507, 103 Atl. 640 (1918); Smith v. Smith, 64 Neb. 563,
90 N. W. 560 (1902); Merrill v. Wisconsin Female College, 74 Wis. 415,
43 N. W. 104 (1889).
13As Illustrative cases, see: Seeley v. Hincks, 65 Conn. 1, 31 Atl.
533 (1894); Colby v. Dean, 70 N. H. 591, 49 Atl. 574 (1901); Webster
v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366, 28 N. W. 353 (1886).
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III. As DEVICES FOR REGULATING THE USE OF 0NVEYED LAND.
A. Requiring a Designated User.
Where a grantor of land desires that the conveyed land shall
be used for some particular purpose, such as railroad, municipal,
canal or irrigation, street or highway, park, burial, educational,
religious, charitable or business, a condition subsequent,3 4 or a
special limitation 5 annexed to the fee simple are the devices
regularly employed, and these are the most effective means of
securing compliance, the only choice between the two lying
between the automatic termination of the special limitation, as
opposed to completing a forfeiture in the case of a condition sub-
sequent. While a condition precedent might be employed here,36
it is subject to certain serious disadvantages. The grantee may
refuse to accept such fearing that an inability to complete per-
formance may cost him the performance already completed. He
would not be inclined to accept land and place improvements
upon it unless given a present ownership. A serious object from
the standpoint of the conveyor is that after a sufficient use is
once commenced, the condition is satisfied, ownership vests, and
a later compliance cannot be enforced. Further, a condition
precedent must satisfy the rule against perpetuities. If a gift
over, rather than a return of the land, is desired in case the con-
veyee fails to conform, an executory limitation is employed.
37
14As illustrative cases, see: Pettit v. Stuttgart Normal Inst., 67
Ark. 430, 55 S. W. 485 (1900); Ocean Beach Realty Co. v. City of
Miami Beach, 106 Fla. 392, 143 So. 301 (1932); Griffith v. Owensboro
& N. R. Co., 16 Ky. L. Rep. 884, 30 S. W. 206 (1895); Trustees of the
General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church v. Alexander, - Ky. -,
46 S. W. 503 (1898); Fayette Co. Bd. of Educ. v. Bryan, 263 Ky. 61,
91 S. W. (2d) 990 (1936); Sargent v. Trustees of Christian Church
of Little Cypress, 252 Ky. 57, 66 S. W. (2d) 5 (1933); Clarke v. Inh. of
Brookfield, 81 Mo. 503, 51 Am. Rep. 243 (1884); Yazoo & M. V. R. Co.
v. Lakeview Traction Co., 100 Miss. 281, 56 So. 393 (1911); Spies v.
Arvondale & C. R. Co., 60 W. Va. 389, 55 S. E. 464 (1906).
11As illustrative cases, see: Carr v. Georgia R. R. Co., 74 Ga. 73
(1884); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 183 Ga. 432, 188 So. 722 (1936);
Board of Education v. Littrell, 173 Ky. 78, 190 S. W. 465 (1917); Dun-
can v. Webster Co. Bd. of Educ., 205 Ky. 86, 265 S. W. 489 (1924);
Hamilton v. City of Jackson, 157 Miss. 284, 127 So. 302 (1930); Sperry's
Lessee v. Pond, 5 Ohio 387, 24 Am. Dec. 296 (1832); Yarbrough v.
Yarbrough, 151 Tenn. 221, 269 S. W. 36 (1925).
'6As an illustrative case, see: Maguire v. City of Macomb, 293 Ill.
441, 127 N. E. 682 (1920).
37As illustrative cases, see: Farnsworth v. Perry, 83 Me. 447,
22 Atl. 373 (1891); In re Jacobs' Will, 280 N. Y. S. 1 (1935); Blue v.
City of Wilmington, 186 N. C. 321, 119 S. E. 741 (1923).
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A disadvantage is that the duration of the executory limitation
must satisfy the permissible period of the rule against perpetui-
ties. While a covenant may be employed in these cases, 38 it may
often prove insufficient to insure compliance because of the dif-
ficulty in showing damages for a breach or sufficient reason for
specific performance. In the case of a conveyance in trust for
charitable purposes, unless a condition subsequent or a special
limitation is also employed, a grantor may be without remedy to
compel the carrying out of the trust purposes, except insofar as
he may be a beneficiary.
B. Prohi-biting a Particular User.
Where a conveyor of land wishes to prevent certain uses of
the land conveyed for some reason personal to himself, a condi-
tion subsequent is normally the more effective device.3 9 How-
ever, where it is desired to impose restraints upon the use of con-
veyed land in order to maintain the eligible character of adjoin-
ing property, a restrictive covenant, or restriction, is often more
suitable than a condition subsequent. The remedy of a restric-
tive covenant, injunction, is often more effective for securing
performance than is a threat of forfeiture. A restrictive cove-
nant may be made available to the adjoining land owners, in cases
whlere the parties are all purchasers from the same grantor, such
owners often being the ones most concerned in having the cove-
nants performed. A condition subsequent may be taken advan-
tage of only by the creator thereof, or his successor in interest.
Consequently, unless the one entitled to forfeit is also an owner
of adjoining property he may not be concerned with a failure to
comply. Conditions subsequent may be employed to prevent
the breach of building restrictions, and there seems no good
reason why a provision may not be incorporated into a deed so as
"'Board of Educ. in Wilmington v. St. Patrick's Roman Catholic
Church, 15 Dela. Ch. 286, 136 Atl. 833 (1927); Brady v. Gregorly, 40
Ind. App. 355, 97 N. E. 452 (1912) Carroll County Academy v. Trus-
tees of Gallatin Academy, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 824, 104 Ky. 621, 47 S. W. 617(1898); Board of Councilmen v. Capital Hotel Co., 188 Ky. 754, 224
S. W. 197 (1920); Co. Bd. of Educ. v. Mill Creek Meth. Church, 242 Ky.
147, 45 S. W. (2d) 1026 (1932).
10As illustrative cases, see: Wakefield v. Van Tassel, 202 II. 41,
66 N. E. 830 (1903); Carbon Block Coal Co. v. Murphy, 101 Ind. 11-5
(1887); Hatcher v. Andrews, 68 Ky. 561 (1869); Sharpe v. N. C. R. Co.,
10 N. C. 350, 129 S. D. 826 (1925); Jeffery v. Graham, 61 Tex. 481(1884).
L. J.-6
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to serve both as a restrictive covenant for the benefit of such
adjoining land owners as may be entitled, and also as a condition
subsequent for the benefit of the grantor.
C. Prescribing Designated Acts with Reference to
Conveyed Land.
Timber may be conveyed, or excepted from a conveyance,
with a provision in the deed that the timber is to be cut and
removed from the land within a prescribed period of time. The
time specified for removal may be incorporated into the deed in
such manner as to operate somewhat in the nature of a condition
subsequent, 40 a condition precedent, 41 or a covenant.42 The
condition subsequent is normally the best of these three methods.
A covenant may not be sufficient protection for the owner of the
land, and applying the general principles of the law of covenants
in strictness might produces some ludicrous results. The vast
majority of the timber cases are glaring examples of a failure on
the part of the parties to the conveyance to select a particular
legal means for securing the removal of the trees from the land
within a prescribed period of time, despite& the fact that each
available legal device produces its own legal results.
Conditions subsequent are very effective means for compel-
ling a grantee to perform certain acts with reference to the con-
veyed land, such as building a fence, erecting a dwelling house
thereon, or digging for minerals and paying royalties.
4OAs illustrative cases, see: Hitt Lumber Co. v. Cullman Coal Co.,
200 Ala. 415, 76 So. 347 (1917); Call v. Jenner Lumber Co., 33 Cal. App.
310, 165 Pac. 23 (1917); Taylor Brown Timber Co. v. Wolf Creek Coal
Co., 32 Ky. L. Rep. 1015, 107 S. W. 733 (1908); Bach v. Little, 140 Ky.
396, 131 S. W. 172 (1910); White v. Foster, 102 Mass. 375 (1869);
Gamble v. Gates, 92 Mich. 510, 52 N. W. 941 (1892); Brown v. Gray,
68 W. Va. 555, 70 S. E. 276 (1911).
"As illustrative cases, see: McLeod v. Dial, 63 Ark. 10, 37. S. W.
306 (1896); Jenkins v. Lykes, 19 Fla. 148, 45 Am. Rep. 19 (1882);
Johnson v. Truitt, 122 Ga. 327, 50 S. D. 135 (1905); Snyder v. Eiast Bay
Lumber Co., 135 Mich. 31, 97 N. W. 49 (1903); Mine La Motte Lead
& Smelting Co. v. White, 106 Mo. App. 2222, 80 S. W. 356 (1904).
4As illustrative cases, see: Zimmerman Mfg. Co. v. Daffin, 149 Ala.
380, 42 So. 858 (1906); Anderson v. Palladine, 39 Cal. App. 256, 178 Pac.
553 (1919); Advance Veneer & Lumber Co. v. Hornaday, 49 Ind. App.
83, 96 N. E. 784 (1911); Hoit v. Stratton, 54 N. H. 109, 20 Am. Rep. 119
(1873); Irons v. Webb, 41 N. J. L. 203, 32 Am. Rep. 193 (1879).
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IV. As DEVICES Foa DIRECTING THE CouRsE OF PROPERTY
OWNERSHEIP.
A. Restraining Alienation.
Since earliest times there has been exhibited an urgent desire
on the part of land owners to continue the ownership of their
land in their family. By restraining inter vivos alienation and
testate succession, such wish might, in a large measure, be grati-
fied. However, public policy is opposed to such restraints, and
the law greatly circumscribes the extent to which the alienation
of a fee simple estate in land may be restricted. In the main all
attempts to impose a perpetual and absolute restraint upon the
transfer or incumbrance of a fee simple estate in either real or
personal property is void and unenforcible. The same is largely
true even though the restraint be qualified as to time or possible
alienees, though a few cases have recognized such restraints if
reasonable. Wherever restraints are thus permitted the methods
employed are disabling restraints, conditions subsequent and
executory limitations. The former will more often than not
prove ineffectual because of lack of enforcement. The choice
between a condition subsequent and an executory limitation will
depend upon whom it is desired shall benefit from a breach.
There is some slight authority that certain restraints will be
upheld when in the form of executory limitations, but not other-
wise.
B. Providing Substitutionary Gifts.
By providing in a conveyance for a substituted transferee
if the first transferee fails to leave descendants to succeed to the
ownership of the property, a transferor is able, to some extent, to
continue the ownership of the property in his own family, if he
so desires. Providing a gift over if the transfereee should die
without surviving issue is also a more or less effective means for
hampering inter vivos alienation as prospective purchasers or
mortgagees will be willing normally to take no more than a gam-
bler's chance on a title that might be defeated at any moment by
events entirely out of their control, and usually the terms under
which they would be willing to proceed will prove unacceptable
to the owner. Providing such substitionary gifts is the major
role played in property law by executory limitations.
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C. Thwartig Creditors.
While attempts have often been made to employ conditions
subsequent and executory limitations annexed to fee simple
estates in real and personal property for the purpose of thwarting
a conveyee's creditors, by preventing tlhem from reaching the con-
veyed property, such attempts usually arouse strong opposition
in the law, and in most American jurisdictions they are of little
avail for, such purposes. In most jurisdictions, the use of a life
estate is more effective here, as the law is more generous in per-
mitting a life estate to be insulated against creditors' claims than
it is a fee simple. A spendthrift trust may prove a suitable
means for this purpose.
